What do we know about the recent performance of Indian banks? by Aggarwal, Laira
Claremont Colleges
Scholarship @ Claremont
CMC Senior Theses CMC Student Scholarship
2019
What do we know about the recent performance of
Indian banks?
Laira Aggarwal
Claremont McKenna College
This Open Access Senior Thesis is brought to you by Scholarship@Claremont. It has been accepted for inclusion in this collection by an authorized
administrator. For more information, please contact scholarship@cuc.claremont.edu.
Recommended Citation
Aggarwal, Laira, "What do we know about the recent performance of Indian banks?" (2019). CMC Senior Theses. 2215.
https://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/2215
 
 
 
 
Claremont McKenna College 
 
 
What Do We know About the Recent Performance of Indian 
Banks? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted to 
Professor Richard C.K. Burdekin 
 
 
 
 
By 
Laira Aggarwal 
 
 
 
 
 
For 
Senior Thesis 
Spring 2019 
April 29, 2019 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
I would like to extend my sincere gratitude to my advisor, Professor Richard Burdekin for 
his constant guidance and support in helping me write this thesis.  I would also like to thank 
all the professors that gave me valuable feedback on my research and always challenged 
me to keep doing my best. Finally, I would like to thank my parents and my Master for 
always giving me emotional support, and my friends for being by my side along this 
journey.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines the performance of Indian banks by studying the effects of recent 
reforms and macroeconomic events. Indian banks went through a period of reforms in the 
past twenty years. The impact of these reforms and major macroeconomic events has been 
examined using time-series analysis. Event studies offer additional perspective on the 
short-run effect of the events on different types of Indian banks. Although, the event dates 
are not all statistically significant in the time-series regressions, the demonetization of 2016 
is significant in the event study analysis. Thus, while reforms and events have immediate 
impact on the performance of Indian banks, the effects did not always persist over the larger 
time-period.  
Key Words: Public Sector Banks, Private Sector Banks, Reforms, Profitability, 
Macroeconomic Shocks 
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Introduction 
 The contribution of Indian banks to the country’s overall GDP has increased 
substantially over the past two decades. In 2018, banking services alone constituted 
21.67% of the country’s GDP.  The economic reforms launched by the Government of 
India over the past decade have significantly changed the landscape of various sectors of 
the economy (Kamath et. al., 2003).  Specifically, the banking and financial sector has 
undergone changes in management, ownership and availability of funds since the 
implementation of reforms. This calls for analyzing the performance of Indian banks and 
their reaction to reforms imposed by the government.  
 India has launched a number of banking reforms since the 1990s. Although there 
is considerable research on the impact of 1990s reforms on banks, there has been little 
analysis of the overall effects of recent reforms on banks and financial institutions. These 
reforms include the launch of payment banks1 in 2015 and the demonetization of Indian 
currency notes in 2016. Macroeconomic events like general elections and global shocks 
are also likely to have an impact on banks. This thesis attempts to analyze the effect of 
recent reforms and macroeconomic events on the Indian banking sector.  
 Chapter 1 begins with the history of the establishment of the banking system in 
India, briefly touching on the historical reforms of the 1980s. However, the primary focus 
of the chapter is on the performance of different types of Indian banks post-2000 time 
period.  
                                                          
1 Payment banks provide small savings accounts, payments, and services to low income households, small 
businesses, and migrant labor workforce. 
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 Chapter 2 presents an empirical study on the effects of recent reforms on stock 
return performance of different types of Indian banks. The overall banking index as well 
as the specific types of bank indices, namely the public and private bank indices, are 
analyzed. As such, this chapter attempts to gauge the reaction of private and public banks 
on the announcement of reforms. Time-series procedure and event studies have been used 
to understand the long-run and short-run effects of the reforms. The results of the 
empirical study indicate that the announcement of demonetization had an immediate, 
significant and positive impact on both public and private banks. The impact of 
demonetization was higher on public banks. However, the impact was not significant 
enough to reflect in the time-series procedure. The announcement of payment banks, on 
the other hand, did not have any impact on the banks.  
 Finally I conclude with the finding that the impact of a reform on banks is largely 
determined by the nature of the reform and its targeted group of beneficiaries. 
Additionally, the public sector banks (PSBs) appear to be more sensitive to reforms than 
do private Banks.     
Chapter 1: Overview of Indian Banking 
A. Establishment and Evolution of Banks 
 The early history of banks in India is closely tied to the colonial period. The 
British introduced formal banks to facilitate business in the country. The first bank in 
India, Bank of Bombay, was established in 1720, with the main purpose of issuing notes. 
It soon went into liquidation and closed. This was followed by a series of Presidency 
banks introduced by the East India Company, one of the colonial companies that 
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functioned as a quasi-governmental organization with its own infrastructure and army. 
Three banks, the Bank of Bengal, the Bank of Bombay and the Bank of Madras were 
established over a period of 40 years and served as Presidency Banks, which served the 
responsibility of modern-day central banks. These banks were mostly private as British 
funds and capital was used to retain control. Figures 1 and 2 show the relative importance 
of Presidency banks as compared to other banks during the late 1800s and early 1900s. 
Until 1913, the Presidency Banks had the most reserves and paid-in capital, after which 
other banks took over. However, in terms of deposits, Presidency Banks dominated the 
landscape despite the increase in the number of other commercial banks from 2 to 36 
(Reserve Bank of India 2008a). 
    Figure 1: Paid-up Capital & Reserves 
 
               Source: The Reserve Bank of India Publication (2008a) 
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                   Figure 2: Total Deposits of Presidency and Other Banks 
 
     Source: The Reserve Bank of India Publication (2008a) 
 In 1921, the Presidency banks merged to form the Imperial Bank of India. The 
Allahabad bank, established in 1865, became the first Indian-owned. This was followed 
by Punjab National Bank, and Bank of India (Reserve Bank of India 2008a).  
 India’s abandonment of the Silver Standard in 1898 was a major reform that 
stabilized the Indian currency. The country experienced a fall in the value of Rupee from 
1871 onwards due to the depreciation in the value of silver against gold. India, then 
joined the Gold standard and fixed the value of rupee at exactly one shilling and four 
pence sterling. This move substantially reduced the costs of having a depreciating 
currency and enhanced the stability of the currency as all the major currencies besides 
China’s were already tied to gold (Reuters 2010). 
 In addition to the currency standard problems, India was also affected by events 
that happened in the west. The Great Depression started in the early 1920s in the UK, 
followed by the 1929 Wall Street crash and worldwide financial panic negatively 
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impacted banks in India. Since India was still under British Raj, there was a contagion 
effect not just from the US but also from the UK.  
It was not until 1935 when the central bank of India, the Reserve Bank of India 
(RBI) came into existence. Due to the decentralized banking system, the RBI was not 
powerful enough to provide stability to banks in the country. For instance, the laisez faire 
policy allowed free entry and exit of new banks in the industry without seeking 
permission of the RBI. Additionally, the ongoing events such as WWII and the Great 
Depression greatly affected the banking landscape. India’s alliances with high-income 
countries resulted in a greater number of bank deposits. As a result, several banks took 
the opportunity to expand. The problem was that these banks had very low capital which 
increased the risk of failure: “low capital base, insufficient liquid assets and inter-
connected lending were some of the major domestic factors” (Reserve Bank of India 
2008). Thus, bank failures persisted despite the establishment of the RBI in 1935. The 
reforms of 1939 finally gave powers to the RBI, which enabled the bank to curb the 
number of bank failures in the country. Figure 3 shows the changes in the trend of bank 
failures after the implementation of the 1939 reform.  
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Figure 3: Number of Bank Failures 
 
Source: The Reserve Bank of India Publication (2008) 
Reforms of the 1990s 
The Imperial Bank of India was nationalized in 1947 and renamed the State Bank 
of India (SBI). At this point in time, all other banks in the country were privately owned. 
In the 1980s, India experienced a second wave of nationalization when six private banks 
were nationalized in order to give the government more control over credit delivery and 
other banking services. Both private and public sector commercial banks could still co-
exist in the country; however, the move towards nationalization led the PSBs to 
eventually control 91 percent of total business in the banking industry (Sensarma 2005). 
RBI imposed stringent regulations on the PSBs to closely monitor the activity of the 
banks and demanded lending quotes. Also, the Statutory Liquidity Ratio2 requirement 
was raised by 12.5 percentage points between 1970 and 1991. However, this strict 
regulatory environment posed a hurdle to banks, and as a result, they were rendered 
unprofitable, inefficient and undercapitalized (Sensarma 2005). Figure 4 shows the 
                                                          
2 The Statutory Liquidity Ratio (SLR) is defined as the proportion of deposits the commercial bank is 
required to maintain with them in the form of liquid assets in addition to the cash reserve ration. 
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Return on Assets (ROA)3 of commercial banks in the pre-reform period. Commercial 
banks started experiencing a downfall since 1975. Starting in 1980, the ROA plunged 
from 65% to 8% within just five years. This was worrisome for the banks as it meant that 
either the income earned was too low or the number of assets held by these banks were 
enormous. Both these scenarios reflect the inefficiency of commercial banks. As a result, 
the substantial dip in the ROA of commercial banks called for reforms in the sector.  
Figure 4: Return on Assets of Commercial Banks 
 
            Source: The Reserve Bank of India Database  
 The government of India launched a series of reforms in the 1990s to improve the 
efficiency and profitability of banks. The Narasimhan committee was set up in 1991 to 
lower the cash reserve ratio and the statutory liquidity ratio. Furthermore, in 1998, 
interest rate deregulation was imposed on deposits and lending. The reforms focused on 
areas such as capital adequacy, bank mergers, and bank autonomy.   
 
                                                          
3 ROA is the ratio of annual net income to average total assets of a business during a financial year and 
reflects efficiency using its assets to generate net income. 
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B. Pre-2000 Landscape:  
        Figure 5: Return on Assets  
 
         Source: The Reserve Bank of India Database 
 Figure 5 shows the trend of ROA for different types of Indian banks in the late 
1990s. The returns on assets held by private banks were consistently higher than those 
held by public banks in the pre-2000 time period. While foreign banks initially struggled 
to have favorable returns, they ended up performing better than other banks by the early 
2000s. There could be two reasons for this: 1) because the foreign banks faced less 
government regulations, or 2) because these banks started using their assets more 
efficiently. While having similar returns to private banks in 1991, the PSBs started 
performing poor in 1992 with plunging returns. However, by early 2000s the returns for 
PSBs picked up and came close to the industry average, though remaining the lowest. 
This suggests that the reforms likely benefitted the PSBs to some extent given that their 
profitability has increased over time.  
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C. Post-2000 Landscape:  
Overall Money Supply and Bank Lending  
 Major changes in monetary policies typically ensue from the unfolding of 
macroeconomic events such as recessions. The biggest global crisis that occurred post 
2000 was the 2008 financial crisis which originated in the U.S but had spillover effects in 
other countries. As a result, the RBI responded with changes in monetary policy. Table 1 
shows the comparative monetary trend in money supply between September 2008 and 
August 2016. Monetary base growth exceeded 100% for all the six countries. The actual 
growth in money supply for China and India increased by 212.7% and 201.7% 
respectively. However, this was not true for other countries since they experienced a huge 
drop in the velocity of money (Burdekin 2018).  As Islam and Rajan (2009) explain, “the 
reserve money growth in India was moderate, owing to the decline in net foreign assets 
and reduction in cash reserve ratios. Nevertheless, both broad money and commercial 
credit have maintained their historic growth trend. As a result, the broad money 
multiplier increased since September 2008.”  
Table 1: Growth of Money Supply between 2008 and 2016(%) 
MONEY 
SUPPLY 
China Japan Eurozone United 
Kingdom 
United 
States 
India 
Total monetary 
base growth  
147.5 284.6 103.1 402.0 316.9 132.7 
Total bank 
money growth  
235.5 -5.9 8.9 -0.9 -6.5 220.1 
Overall money 
supply growth  
212.7 20.3 18.0 16.2 9.9 201.7 
     Source: Burdekin (2018); The Reserve Bank of India Database 
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 Table 2 shows the steps taken by the RBI to expand bank lending. The measures 
resulted in the augmentation of liquidity of over Rs.5.85 trillion, thereby easing liquidity 
position and building confidence in the financial market (Mohan and Ray 2018).  
Table 2: Measures Taken to forestall liquidity pressures 
Repo Rate Reduced  9% (August 2008) to 4.75% (August 
2009) 
Reverse Repo Rate Reduced 6% (August 2008) to 3.25% (April 
2009) 
Cash Reserve Ratio  9% (August 2008) to 4.75% (April 
2009) 
Special Repo Window introduced 
under the liquidity adjustment 
facility for banks for on-lending to 
mutual funds 
 
Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) 
instituted  
- to provide liquidity support to non-
banking financial companies 
Special refinance facility introduced  -to provide access to banks without any 
collateral 
NBHCs allowed access to foreign 
borrowing 
-Corporates allowed to buy back 
foreign currency convertible bonds  
Rupee-Dollar swap facility 
instituted for banks with overseas 
branches 
 
        Source: Reserve Bank of India 
According to Bajpai (2011), “the RBI responded to the emergent situation by 
facilitating monetary expansion through decreases in the CRR, RR and R-RR rates, and 
the SLR.” The subsequent increase in the Indian bank lending involved funds going to 
commercial banks and individuals. However, this decision of increasing bank lending was 
not instituted in the West, where lending stagnated. According to Hanke, this is primarily 
due to the tightening of bank regulation and supervision (Hanke 2016). India is more like 
China’s case, where high lending rates were also maintained.  
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As expected, the credit to deposit (CDR)4 ratio increased for both public and private 
sector banks in 2008. Bajpai (2011) attributes this increase to the expansion in net RBI 
credit to the central government in the second-half of 2008. Figure 6 illustrates the trend 
of CDR for different bank groups in the country. After the 2008 crisis, the CDR continued 
to increase for the private sector banks, reaching roughly 90% in 2018. On the other hand, 
the CDR figures for PSBs and foreign banks continue to remain volatile, reducing roughly 
to 70% in 2018—much lower than the value during the financial crisis. This suggests that 
unlike other banks, private banks have a solid hold over their current liquidity positions. 
         Figure 6: Credit-Deposit Ratio (%) 
 
         Source: Reserve Bank of India 
 
Profitability Measure 
While similar trends in profitability measures prevailed in the 1990s for different 
bank groups, the post-2000 time period provides a different picture. Figures 7 and 8 
                                                          
4 The CDR is a ratio of bank’s total loans to total deposits and is used to assess a bank’s liquidity. 
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illustrate the trend in ROA and Return on Equity (ROE)5 for the public sector, private 
sector and foreign banks. While, the private sector banks experienced an increase in the 
returns after the 2008 financial crisis, reflecting efficient performances, the returns 
plunged in 2014. Foreign banks followed similar patters but with greater volatility, owing 
to external events.  Overall, the PSBs performed the worst over the past decade with 
negative ROA and ROE in 2018, a significant difference from the private and foreign 
bank figures.  
        Figure 7: Return on Assets (2000-2018) 
 
         Source: Reserve Bank of India Database 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5 The ROE ratio is another measure of profitability of banks. It is a measure of financial performance 
of a bank. There is a direct relation between the ROA and the ROE. 
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        Figure 8: Return on Equity (2000-2018) 
 
        Source: Reserve Bank of India Database 
 Figure 9 shows the recent trend in the Non-Performing Assets (NPAs)6 of Indian 
banks. The NPA of the PSBs is the highest of all brank groups in the country. These bank 
returns deteriorated sharply in the last few years as NPAs increased. Public banks like the 
Punjab National bank, Union bank, and Allahabad bank reported significant losses in 
2017-18 with NPAs worth 80-120% of their net worth (Merwin 2018). Private Banks, on 
the other hand, performed consistently, with relatively low NPA and high ROA figures. 
According to an article in the Business Standard (2014), “Public Sector banks, with a 
70% market share, were worst hit…Private Banks, cautious in expanding their balance 
sheets, fared well.”  
 
 
                                                          
6 The RBI defines NPAs as loans or advances for which the principal or interest payments remain 
overdue for 90 days. NPAs are closely related to Non-Performing Loans (NPLs). 
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     Figure 9: Gross Non-Performing Assets  
 
      Source: Reserve Bank of India Database 
Due to the significant differences in the performance of public and private banks 
over the past few years, it is crucial to examine the impact of reforms and 
macroeconomic shocks on these banks separately. The two most recent reforms in India, 
the announcement of Payment Banks and Demonetization in 2015 and 2016 respectively 
are focus event dates for this thesis. According to a Business Today article (2015), 
“Payment Banks will be a new category of banks…the current lot of universal banks can 
do these transactions too…but now with payment banks, they [commercial banks] are 
likely to feel threatened.” Former Governor of India, Raghuram Rajan, believes that 
“they [payment banks] could act like feeder banks and make the larger banks more 
competitive” (Merchant 2015). This serves as a motivation to study the impact of the 
announcement of payment banks on the banking landscape of the country. Additionally, 
the Prime Minister’s sudden announcement of demonetization created banking havoc in 
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the country, with the RBI being underprepared to meet the demand of new currency 
notes. This is reason enough to examine this specific event.  
Existing literature provides analyses of the short-run effects of the two reform 
events. Jain’s (2017) study suggests that demonetization affected private and public 
sector banks differently. Specifically, Jain demonstrates that “the public sector witnessed 
an immediate positive effect on the returns whereas the private sector recorded a lagged 
negative impact”. However, no long-term analysis has been conducted to examine the full 
effects of these reforms. The purpose of this thesis is to provide a comprehensive analysis 
of major events that have impacted the banking industry. While the focus is both on the 
short-term and long-term effects of payment banks and demonetization on Indian banks, 
other events have been included for a comprehensive understanding. 
Chapter 2: Empirical Study  
For this thesis, data have been collected from the Bloomberg Terminal and the 
Reserve Bank of India database. Two types of empirical studies are conducted to analyze 
the stock return performance of bank indices, 1) time-series procedure, and 2) event study 
procedure. 
A. Time Series Analysis  
Data and Methodology: 
As per the efficient market hypothesis, all players in the stock market have equal 
access to knowledge and therefore the stocks should be priced perfectly, including all 
known prior information. This perhaps suggests that the stock returns adequately reflect 
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the impact of reforms and shocks on banks. Thus, stock returns will be used for the time-
series analysis.  
Variables: 
Weekly and monthly periodic return data are collected from 2000 onwards from 
Bloomberg. Since the purpose of the thesis is to examine the impact of events on 
different types of banks, separate regressions are run with overall Nifty Bank Index, 
Public Sector Bank Index and Private Sector Bank index as the dependent variables. Lags 
of the appropriate Bank Index, Nifty 50 Index, S&P 500 Index, and percentage change in 
the Rupee/US dollar exchange rate are the independent variables.  
The Nifty Bank Index has data ranging from 2000-2019, the Nifty Public Sector 
Bank has data ranging from 2004-2019, and the Nifty Private Sector Bank Index has data 
ranging from 2005-2019. Lags are used to determine the extent to which previous returns 
explain current returns of the bank index. Lags control for inertia in the market in 
determining the present value of the dependent variable (Wilkins 2017). Returns and 
percentage changes present non-stationarity in the data. Nifty 50, a market index, covers 
the biggest companies in the country including major banks. The S&P500 Index is used 
to incorporate the effects of the U.S market. Finally, the exchange rates variable is the 
percentage change in the INR-USD exchange rates. It is used to control for the effects of 
exchange rate changes in making Indian assets more, or less, valuable abroad.  
The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the Shwarz Bayesian information 
criterion (BIC) are the most frequently used approaches in the time-series literature to 
determine an optimal lag length, with BIC being the more parsimonious approach 
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(Gonzalo and Pitarakis, 2002). Table 3 shows that the optimal lag length for the 
dependent variable is estimated using BIC and is found to be 4 for the Nifty Bank Index.   
Table 3: Optimal Lag Length Determination       
 
Choice of Events:   
In addition to demonetization and the announcement of payment banks, it is crucial to 
study other events that might have affected the banking landscape after 2000. The Bai-
Perron procedure allows for the estimation of multiple structural breaks in a data set at 
the same time (Bai 1997). According to Burdekin and Siklos, multiple breaks might exist 
in the trends of economic time series (1995). Hence, in order to make comprehensive 
statistical inferences from a time-series procedure, identification of unknown break points 
is crucial. The following dates are identified using the Bai-Perron test:  
1) Global Financial Crisis (10/24/2008) 
2) General Elections (05/16/2009) 
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3) Payment Banks Announcement(8/19/2015) 
4) China’s Economy Slowdown (8/24/2015) 
5) Demonetization (11/10/2016) 
Figure 10 appears to confirm the impact of the above-mentioned events on the Nifty bank 
stock returns. Hence, these event dates are used for the time-series analysis.  
Figure 11: Periodic Return of NIFTY Bank Index 
 
Global Financial Criteria 
It is not a surprise that the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 shook markets across 
the world. Global stock markets plunged drastically on October 24, 2008 due to the 
ongoing credit crisis, sluggish profit forecasts, and falling commodity prices in the West 
(Twin 2008). As such, the daily stock return of the Indian bank index fell by 12.63% on 
October 24, 2008, its biggest decline in ten years. In response to the crisis, the RBI 
implemented the monetary easing and liquidity enhancements measures described in the 
previous section. The RBI reduced the CRR and provided a facility to swap dollars for 
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Indian banks. Additional measures were implemented to encourage flow of credit to 
sectors experiencing financial pressure: these include reduction of risk weights on banks’ 
exposure to certain sectors and reduction of lending rates. Meanwhile, the government 
launched two fiscal packages to boost aggregate demand (Reuters 2009). The sudden dip 
in the stock market coupled with the aggressive response by the RBI and the Indian 
government makes it crucial to understand the impact of the crisis on Indian banks. Thus, 
it seems appropriate to analyze the overall effect of the 2008 financial crisis event on the 
Indian bank indices.  
General Elections 
In the current global landscape, political news significantly impacts the 
performance stock markets. News surrounding election results affect the stock market 
due to changes in investor sentiment. The 2004 and 2009 general election events are of 
importance due to the surprising results of the elections. With the Bharatiya Janata Party 
(BJP) landing in a surprise victory, the Indian stock market plunged and fell by 12.93% 
on May 14, 2004, the day after the results were announced. However, the stock market 
had a completely opposite reaction to the 2009 General election results, with the daily 
Nifty Bank index return increasing by 18% on May 18, 2009. On May 16, 2008 India’s 
ruling party, the Congress, achieved an unexpectedly decisive victory. Defying exit polls 
and analysts’ predictions, the party won more than 70% of the vote with more than 250 
seats, while the opposition party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), took 160 seats 
(Gentleman 2009). The difference in the effects of these general elections on the stock 
market is perhaps due to the investor sentiment on the two political parties: The Congress 
party, led by Dr. Manmohan Singh, an economist, had an edge over the BJP in its ability 
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to implement economic reforms in the country. While Dr. Singh was perceived as being 
capable of instituting economic and sound banking reforms, BJP lacked economists who 
could improve the overall economy of the country (Gentleman 2009). To gauge the 
impact of general elections on the banking landscape, the 2009 election has been studied 
because, (1) it had a larger absolute effect than the 2004 election on the Nifty bank index, 
(2) it is the more recent of the two general elections, and (3) it was significant in the Bai-
Perron testing.  
Payment Banks Announcement 
In recent years, the effects of digitalization have seeped through emerging 
economies. Consequently, the growth in the mobile subscriber base of rural Indians has 
allowed for their greater financial inclusion in the economy. For instance, Kenya and 
Brazil have been successful in transforming the rural population’s payment systems with 
the use of mobile payment networks (Reddy 2018). Hence, India made a proposal in 
November 2014 to launch payment banks and the RBI approved 11 applicants on 19 
August 2015. According to Reddy (2018), payment banks posed a serious challenge to 
existing commercial banks in the payment services line of business and deposit 
mobilization because payment banks targeted a large number of unbanked customers who 
are not covered by traditional banks. Reddy finds that the anticipation of the 
announcement negatively impacted the stock prices of commercial banks. While 
literature exists on the immediate impact of this reform on the stock market, there is no 
analysis of its overall impact on the profitability of the commercial banks.  
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China’s Economy Slowdown 
 China’s substantial slowdown in 2015 was a concern for countries that had strong 
linkages to it. While India is relatively protected due to its limited direct trade links with 
China, a reduction in Chinese commodity prices indirectly affected India as it posed a 
risk to investments made by firms in metals, mining and oil exploration sectors. A study 
conducted by IMF suggests that global financial markets were vulnerable to China’s 
problems and China’s slowdown impacted many developing countries (Mishra 2015). 
Thus, including this event in the study is appropriate.  
Demonetization 
In 2016, Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, highlighted that “the magnitude of cash 
in circulation is directly linked to the level of corruption” (Beyes and Bhattacharya 2017). 
He then made a surprise announcement on the evening of 8 November 2016 to 
demonetize the country’s two largest-denomination notes, worth 500 and 1000 rupees, to 
mitigate the problem of corruption in the country. India had experienced demonetization 
for the first time in 1946 when Rs 1000, 5000, and 10,000 notes were discontinued. 
Almaqtari et al (2018) assess the determinants of profitability of Indian banks using 
demonetization as one of the macroeconomic factors in their panel data analysis. The 
authors show that reform was statistically significant in affecting the profitability of 
banks. 
Theoretical Model: 
OLS is used to examine the significance of events and other explanatory variables 
in explaining a bank index’s return performance.   
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𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑐 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑗 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑐 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑠 + 𝛽2 𝑁𝑖𝑓𝑡𝑦 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 +
𝛽3 𝑆&𝑃500 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 + 𝛽4 % 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝐼𝑁𝑅/𝑈𝑆𝐷 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 + 𝛽5 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑘     
Where i= Nifty Bank Index, Public Sector Banks Index, Private Sector Bank Index,  
𝑗 ∈ [1,4] and k= Global Financial Crisis, General Elections, Payment Banks 
Announcement, China’s Economy Slowdown, Demonetization  
 
Results: 
 Table 4 presents the results of the multiple linear regression model for the weekly 
series over the 2000-2019 time period for Nifty Bank Index. It suggests that the 1st and 
2nd lags of the Nifty Bank Index variable significantly explain the movements in the 
present value of the Nifty Bank Index, at a 95% confidence level. Additionally, the U.S 
stock market lag is significant at the 10% level. These results persist upon including the 
event dummies. While none of the events are significant in the weekly series, China’s 
slowdown event is significant at the 95% level in the monthly series. The coefficient sign 
is negative suggesting that the effect was slowing the Indian bank performance. This 
speaks to the potential influence of China over the Indian banks, despite the two countries 
having only indirect relations and a few significant ties. Additionally, the exchange rate 
lag variable is statistically significant at the 95% confidence level in both the weekly and 
monthly series. The coefficient sign is negative suggesting that the weakening of the 
Indian Rupee lowers bank returns. This could well reflect the selling of Indian bank 
stocks by foreign investors who own roughly 20% of PSB stocks and at least 49% of 
private bank stocks, and who would lower dollar valuations of their holdings as the rupee 
weakens (Reserve Bank of India 2010).   
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Table 4: Nifty Bank Index Regressions 
 WEEKLY MONTHLY 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Constant 0.0041 
[0.0013] 
0.0040 
[0.0019] 
0.0243 
[0.0067] 
0.0247 
[0.0094] 
Nifty Bank (-1) 
 
-0.1093** 
[0.0531] 
-0.1141** 
[0.0532] 
-0.0689 
[0.1286] 
-0.0883 
[0.1292] 
Nifty Bank (-2) 0.0826*** 
[0.0318] 
0.0779** 
[0.0318] 
-0.1064 
[0.0670] 
-0.1098 
[0.0673] 
Nifty Bank (-3) -0.0437 
[0.0316] 
-0.0471 
[0.0316] 
0.0052 
[0.0671] 
0.0032 
[0.0674] 
Nifty Bank (-4) 
 
0.0499 
[0.0314] 
0.0465 
[0.0315] 
-0.0303 
[0.0672] 
-0.0229 
[0.0681] 
Nifty 50 (-1) 0.0797 
[0.0751] 
0.0774 
[0.0752] 
-0.0158 
[0.1803] 
-0.0265 
[0.1808] 
S&P500 (-1) 
 
0.1124* 
[0.0607] 
0.1133* 
[0.0609] 
0.2162 
[0.1774] 
0.2587 
[0.1857] 
Exchange Rate(-1) 
 
-0.2648** 
[0.1351] 
-0.2697** 
[0.1376] 
-0.7153** 
[0.3494] 
-0.7248** 
[0.3526] 
Financial Crisis 
  
0.0098 
[0.0071] 
 0.0372 
[0.0321] 
General Elections 
 
 0.0003 
[0.0029] 
 0.0014 
[0.0140] 
China Slowdown 
 
 -0.0131 
[0.0086] 
 -0.0622* 
[0.0376] 
Payment Banks  0.0004 
[0.0041] 
 0.0004 
[0.0189] 
Demonetization 
 
 -0.0101 
[0.0149] 
 -0.0559 
[0.0657] 
 
Observations 
 
994 994 
 
224 
 
224 
R-squared 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.07 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5: Weekly Periodic Return of Public and Private Banks 
                  Public Banks          Private Banks 
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
Constant 0.0031 
[0.0032] 
0.0040 
[0.0031] 
Bank Index (-1) 
 
-0.0725 
[0.0527] 
-0.1686** 
[0.0752] 
Bank Index (-2) 0.0531 
[0.0358] 
0.1239*** 
[0.0378] 
Bank Index (-3) -0.0244 
[0.0356] 
-0.0612 
[0.0372] 
Bank Index (-4) 
 
0.0596* 
[0.0357]] 
0.0444 
[0.0371] 
Nifty 50 (-1) -0.0123 
[0.1049] 
0.1027 
[0.1122] 
S&P500 (-1) 
 
0.1656* 
[0.0926] 
0.2119*** 
[0.0778] 
Exchange Rate(-1) 
 
-0.5741 
[0.2270] 
-0.1718 
[0.1943] 
Financial Crisis 
 
0.0076*** 
[0.0025] 
0.0132* 
[0.0075] 
General Elections 
 
-1.03E-06 
[0.0042] 
0.0006 
[0.0038] 
China Slowdown 
 
-0.0199* 
[0.011] 
-0.0101 
[0.0089] 
Payment Banks -0.0002 
[0.0050] 
-0.0003 
[0.0041] 
Demonetization 
 
-0.0011 
[0.0183] 
-0.0177 
[0.0161] 
 
Observations 786 
 
719 
R-squared 0.03 0.05 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 5 presents results of the weekly periodic returns of private and public 
banks. Both private and public banks follow the same trend as the overall bank index. 
The 1st and 2nd lags of the private (public) bank index as well as the S&P500 index are 
highly significant. The Great Recession significantly affected the returns of public and 
private banks, with a 99% significance level for public banks and a 90% significance 
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level for private banks. The crisis event increased private banks’ weekly return by 1.32% 
points. This is likely due to the numerous aggressive stimulus packages implemented by 
the RBI at the onset of the crisis. Since public banks are subject to more regulations, the 
stimulus packages had a direct positive impact on these banks, which is more than the 
implied effect on private banks. This explains the positive sign on the Financial Crisis 
coefficient. The 2015 Chinese crisis dummy was significant at the 90% confidence level 
in impacting PSBs periodic returns. The crisis shook foreign investor confidence in Asian 
markets, thereby negatively affecting Indian banks, despite the country’s weak links with 
China. Foreign Institutional Investors (FII), accounting 20% of the PSBs’ shareholding, 
reduced investments in Indian bank equities by 81% in the 2015 fiscal year (Oberoi 
2018).  
Since the purpose of this thesis is to examine the overall banking landscape of the 
country, it is also of interest to analyze bank trends in the years prior to the occurrence of 
the events. Hence, time-series analysis has been conducted for the sub period 2000-2007, 
2007 being the last year of no major event. Regression analysis of specific bank types has 
been avoided due to the lack of sufficient data for the study. Hence, only the overall Nifty 
Bank Index is used for the study of trends in the sub-period. Table 6 shows that none of 
the variables are significant in explaining the movements in the Nifty Bank Index in the 
sub-period regression. The S&P500 index, while highly significant in the full sample 
analysis, loses its significance in the early sub-period. This suggests that the effects of the 
U.S market on the Nifty Bank Index are substantial only in the more liberalized period 
post 2000. This speaks to the potential interrelatedness of the U.S markets with the 
26 
 
subsequent macroeconomics events in the study. In summary, the explanatory variables 
chosen for this study are of significance only in the entire sample period.    
Table 6: Weekly Periodic Return for Nifty 
Bank 
VARIABLES                                  (1) 
Constant 0.0060 
[0.0022] 
Nifty Bank (-1) 
 
-0.0741 
[0.0719] 
Nifty Bank (-2) 0.0336 
[0.0502] 
Nifty Bank (-3) 0.0077 
[0.0502] 
Nifty Bank (-4) 
 
-0.0175 
[0.0491] 
Nifty 50 (-1) 0.0661 
[0.0961] 
S&P500 (-1) 
 
0.0892 
[0.0996] 
Exchange Rate(-1) 
 
-0.2780 
[0.4893] 
 
Observations 
 
412 
R-squared 0.01 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 In summary, the results of the time series analysis indicate that the announcement 
of payment banks and demonetization did not have a statistically significant impact on 
the returns of bank indices. This, however, could be a figment of these events’ being near 
the end of the sample. Since the two reforms happened recently, it might be that there is 
not enough data to properly assess the full impact. Another possible reason for the lack of 
long-term significance of the demonetization dummy is the eventual failure of the policy. 
As per the Reserve Bank of India, “99 percent of the value of the old bills that had been 
removed from circulation eventually found its way back into the financial system” 
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(Gentleman 2018). While, the final outcome of the policy was that it did not really 
change the existing banking landscape of the country, the policy did bring havoc to 
financial institutes in the short-run:  
“The immediate fallout was chaos, as the country scrambled to cope. 
There was a rush at banks and ATMs to exchange old notes and withdraw 
new currency. Queues at banks grew; many people suffered, especially 
the poor, who had no access to credit cards…” (Krishnan 2018) 
Thus, to gauge the immediate effects of these events an event study is conducted focusing 
on the stock return movements around the specific event dates. An event study aims to 
examine the impact of specific events on the banks’ stock returns (Khotari and Warner 
2006). 
B. Event Study 
Methodology: 
 Using the same event dates as those tested in the procedure for time series 
regression, we define each event window as the number of observations before and after 
the event date and the estimation window is the number of observations before and after 
the event window. Event window of ±1 and ±2 days have been used for this thesis. 
Estimation windows of 15, 30 and 45 days are applied to bank stock returns to assess the 
immediate share price responses. Event studies have been conducted for all events to 
assess the share price reaction of the overall bank index. However, the event studies of 
public and private sector banks are limited to the announcements of payment banks and 
demonetization.  
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Results: 
The tables below show the regression results of the specific Bank Index on its lags 
and the events. Table 7 (a) shows the results of the Nifty bank index event study with a 
window of ±1 days and an estimation window of 15, 30 and 45 days respectively. The 
financial crisis event is statistically significant in all estimation windows, with a 99% 
confidence level in the 45 days estimation window. The UPA general elections’ result is 
highly significance at the 99% level across all three estimation windows. The Chinese 
crisis events is significant at the 99% confidence level for the 45 days estimation 
window. Finally, the demonetization and payment bank announcement events are not 
significant in any estimation windows.  
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 7 (b) shows the results for the event study on the Nifty bank index with a 
nearest event window of ±2 days and an estimation window of 15, 30 and 45 days 
respectively. The financial crisis, UPA victory and China slowdown events remain 
statistically significant over all estimation windows. The demonetization event gains 
Table 7(a): Daily Periodic Return for Nifty Bank Index  
 Event window 
±1; Estimation 
Window 15 
Event window 
±1; Estimation 
Window 30 
Event window 
±1; Estimation 
Window 45 
Financial Crisis  -0.079** 
[0.0357] 
-0.067** 
[0.0268] 
-0.069*** 
[0.0241] 
General 
Elections 
0.110*** 
[0.0261] 
0.099*** 
[0.0202] 
0.092*** 
[0.0207] 
Payment Banks 
Announcement  
-0.003 
[0.0140] 
-0.009 
[0.0115] 
-0.009 
[0.0089] 
China 
Slowdown  
-0.029** 
[0.0164] 
-0.029** 
[0.0125] 
-0.030*** 
[0.0103] 
Demonetization 
Announcement  
0.013 
[0.0089] 
0.011 
[0.0073] 
0.010 
[0.0064] 
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significance at the 98% level in all three estimation windows. However, the payment 
bank announcement is still not significant in any estimation windows.  
Table 7 (b): Daily Periodic Return for Nifty Bank Index  
 Event window 
±2; Estimation 
Window 15 
Event window 
±2; Estimation 
Window 30 
Event window 
±2; Estimation 
Window 45 
Financial Crisis  -0.059* 
[0.0299] 
-0.046* 
[0.2188] 
-0.046** 
[0.0195] 
General Elections 0.070*** 
[0.0245] 
0.069*** 
[0.0177] 
0.048** 
[0.0183] 
Payment Banks 
Announcement  
-0.003 
[0.0119] 
-0.009 
[0.0115] 
-0.008 
[0.0076] 
China Slowdown -0.025* 
[0.0130] 
-0.027*** 
[0.0097] 
-0.028*** 
[0.0078] 
Demonetization 
Announcement  
0.017** 
[0.0063] 
0.015** 
[0.0062] 
0.015** 
[0.0062] 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Tables 8 (a) and (b) present results for daily returns of the Private Sector Bank 
index with event windows of ±1 and ±2 days respectively. The demonetization event is 
significant at 90% and 95% level in all estimation windows when the event window is ±2 
days. However, it is only significant in the 15 days estimation window when the event 
window is ±1 day. The payment banks announcement is not significant in any case.  
Table 8 (a): Daily Periodic Return of Private Sector Bank Index  
 Event window 
±1; Estimation 
Window 15 
Event window 
±1; Estimation 
Window 30 
Event window ±1; 
Estimation Window 
45 
Payment Banks 
Announcement on 
08/19/2015 
-0.005 
[0.0265] 
-0.008 
[0.0099] 
-0.009 
[0.0087] 
Demonetization 
Announcement on 
11/08/2016 
0.010* 
[0.0061] 
0.008 
[0.0075] 
0.008 
[0.0067] 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 8 (b): Daily Periodic Return of Private Sector Bank Index  
 Event window 
±2; Estimation 
Window 15 
Event window 
±2; Estimation 
Window 30 
Event window ±2; 
Estimation Window 
45 
Payment Banks 
Announcement on 
08/19/2015 
-0.006 
 [0.0122] 
-0.009 
[0.0083] 
-0.019 
[0.0136] 
Demonetization 
Announcement on 
11/08/2016 
0.014** 
[0.0065] 
0.010* 
[0.0057] 
0.010* 
[0.0052] 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 Tables 9 (a) and (b) present the results for the daily returns of the Public Sector 
Bank Index with event windows of ±1 and ±2 days respectively. The demonetization 
event is significant at the 99% level over all estimation windows when the event window 
is ±2 days and significant for the 30 and 45 days estimation windows when the event 
window is ±1 day. This suggests that demonetization had a more significant impact on 
PSBs than private banks. Most of the deposits came from low-income households in rural 
parts of the country. The PSBs, dominating the rural space of India, benefitted the most 
due to swelling deposits and falling treasury yields (Acharya 2016). The payment banks 
event remained insignificant for the PSBs.  
Table 9 (a): Daily Periodic Return of Public Sector Bank Index 
 Event window ±1; 
Estimation Window 15 
Event window 
±1; Estimation 
Window 30 
Event window 
±1; Estimation 
Window 45 
Payment Banks 
Announcement on 
08/19/2015 
-0.021 
[0.0235] 
-0.019 
[0.0171] 
-0.019 
[0.0144] 
Demonetization 
Announcement on 
11/08/2016 
0.031 
[0.0204] 
0.026* 
[0.0141] 
0.025** 
[0.0123] 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 9 (b): Daily Periodic Return of Public Sector Bank Index  
 Event window 
±2; Estimation 
Window 15 
Event window 
±2; Estimation 
Window 30 
Event window ±2; 
Estimation Window 
45 
Payment Banks 
Announcement on 
08/19/2015 
0.008 
[0.0186] 
0.005 
[0.0268] 
0.007 
[0.0454] 
Demonetization 
Announcement on 
11/08/2016 
0.040*** 
[0.0144] 
0.031*** 
[0.010] 
0.037*** 
[0.0111] 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
It seems that, while demonetization did not have any long-term significant effects 
on the banking industry in India, it had a significant short-term effect on the PSBs. The 
significant positive effect for the PSBs can be attributed to the extended reach of these 
banks in rural areas of the country. The PSBs have more than twice the number of 
branches in India as compared to private banks. Schemes like the Pradhan Mantri Jan 
Dhan Yojna that provide easy access to bank account to many rural allowed for the PSBs 
to witness high deposits after the announcement of demonetization (Jain 2017).  
The payment banks announcement event did not significantly change the existing 
landscape of Indian banks, perhaps because the “main target for payment banks will be 
small businesses and low-income households”. While provisions of financial services to 
these target groups does impose competition to the big commercial banks, the scope of 
competition is limited because financial services to low-income households are a small 
proportion of services offered by the commercial banks. 
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Conclusion 
The Indian banking landscape experienced significant changes after 2000. While 
performing similarly before 2000, PSBs and private sector banks demonstrated a change 
in their relative performance in the early 2000 as seen through the profitability trends for 
both the sectors. By the late 2000s, the PSBs had negative asset and equity returns which 
were primarily caused by a high volume of NPAs. The Gross NPA figures for public 
banks differed by roughly 90% from the private and foreign banks’ NPAs in 2018. 
Therefore, it seemed crucial to estimate the impact of recent reforms and macroeconomic 
shocks separately for these banks. A time series procedure for 2000-2019 time period did 
not yield any statistically significant results for the 2015 and 2016 policy moves. 
However, demonetization and other events except for payment banks were statistically 
significant in the event study analysis. Demonetization was significant for both private 
and public banks, but it had a higher impact on the stock returns of PSBs. Since public 
banks dominate the banking landscape in India, the sensitivity of public banks to reforms 
is unsurprising.  
The heterogeneity analysis on different bank groups suggest that PSBs are both 
the worst performing banks, and are the most responsive to reforms. Thus, it is necessary 
for the RBI to institute new reforms that have a lasting and positive impact on these 
banks. Consequently, the Banks Board Bureau (BBB) has made suggestions to 
professionalize the boards for PSBs by bringing in experts on risk managements, 
information technology and human resource management (Economic Times 2019). 
Furthermore, the BBB and the central government are currently developing an objective 
framework for performance evaluation which should improve focus on transparency, 
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accountability and skills. These proposed suggestions aim to provide the PSBs with 
resources to curb their high rates of loan delinquency, among others. Thus, the institution 
of new reforms should augment and strengthen the performance of the banking landscape 
in the country. In order to understand the implications of these new reforms on the 
banking landscape, further studies can be conducted using findings from this thesis.  
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Appendix 
 
Figure A1: Nifty Bank Index Closing Price  
 
Figure A2: Nifty Public Bank Index Periodic Return 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015 2018
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
R
u
p
ee
s
10/24/2008
5/18/2009
8/24/2015
11/9/2016
10/25/2017
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018
-20.00%
-15.00%
-10.00%
-5.00%
0.00%
5.00%
10.00%
15.00%
20.00%
25.00%
30.00%
35.00%
39 
 
Figure A3: Nifty Public Bank Index Closing Price 
 
Figure A4: Nifty Private Banks Periodic Return 
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Figure A5: Nifty Private Banks Closing Price 
 
 
Figure A6: Nifty Bank Index and Nifty 50 Index Periodic Return Comparison 
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Table A1: Nifty Bank Index Weekly Series with Demonetization Event 
 
Table A2: Nifty Bank Index Weekly Series with Payment Banks Event  
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Table A3: Nifty Bank Index Monthly Series with Demonetization Event 
 
Table A4: Nifty Bank Index Monthly Series with Payment Banks Event 
 
